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Abstract Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vick-
rey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome
(allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we
auto-generate verified executable code from the formally defined auction.
This removes a source of error in implementing the auction design. We
intend to use formal methods to verify new auction designs. Here, our
contribution is to introduce and demonstrate the use of formal methods
for auction verification in the familiar setting of a well-known auction.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a unified approach to two important questions in auction
design and practice: 1. the question of sound specification (for any valid set of
inputs, i.e. bids, does the auction result in a unique outcome, i.e. allocation and
transfers?), and 2. that of reliable implementation of the specification (is the
auction software a faithful implementation of the auction design?). Failure on
either front can be hugely costly – resulting in both litigation and reputational
damage – especially in high-stakes, one-off auctions.
Therefore, novel auction designs are typically extensively tested before im-
plementation. In simple cases, theoretical results may exist (e.g. the well-known
revenue equivalence results, or Vickrey’s theorem about truth-telling as a weakly
dominant strategy). Further, there are no well-known errors in any manually-
derived theorems in auction theory, nor do leading auction theorists doubt im-
portant results’ soundness. Rather, their greater concern – especially for more
complicated auctions, or auctions running under less restrictive conditions than
theory typically assumes (e.g. risk-neutrality, or common knowledge of the sup-
port of bidders’ valuations) – is that theory is insufficient. In these cases, auction
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designs and their software implementations are tested on test data (as, e.g., gen-
erated by CATS [15]), in experimental labs, and as ‘dry runs’ with the intended
bidders. Such tests may add considerably to confidence in an auction, but merely
demonstrate that no anomalies have been discovered yet on the finite set of test
cases to which the auction has been exposed.4
When more confidence is desired, it may be possible to prove certain prop-
erties using mechanised methods. In the same way that computer algebra soft-
ware such as Mathematica confirms algebraic calculations or solves algebraic
problems, proof assistants can be used to confirm logical operations, or even to
generate proofs.
Early hopes that mechanised reasoning would solve open mathematical prob-
lems proved too optimistic, with only three important results falling to mechan-
ised means. First, over 100 years after the four-colour map theorem was posed
(four colours suffice to colour any planar map without any adjacent regions
sharing a colour), it was proved by a combination of mathematical text and
a purpose-built computer program [8]. Despite concerns about relying on such
‘black box’ code, the proof has been grudgingly accepted, and has subsequently
been confirmed by Coq, a general-purpose theorem prover [8]. Second, Robbins’
conjecture that one of the axioms in Huntington’s basis for Boolean algebras
was equivalent to one of his axioms was resolved after 60 years when a solver
generated – after running for eight days – a 17-step proof that humans could
check manually; fine-tuning found an eight-step proof in five days [16]. Third,
Kepler’s conjecture about optimal sphere packing was reduced, by the mid-20th
century, to exploring about 5,000 possible packings. Hales solved that by min-
imising a 150-variable function on each packing, generating some 100,000 linear
programming problems [9]. As 12 human referees could only – after a five-year
review – report that they were ‘99% certain’ the proof was correct, Hales set out
to use the HOL Light general-purpose theorem prover in the same way that Coq
had been used to prove the four-colour map theorem.
Outside of pure mathematics, theorem provers have been more widespread.
Following an embarrassing and costly recall in the mid-1990s, Intel has used
theorem provers to confirm that, for example, its chips satisfy the IEEE floating
point division standard: viewing a chip as a set of Boolean statements, a prover
may ask whether particular theorems hold within the world defined by those
statements [10]. Similarly, any computer program defines a logical universe in
which theorem provers may assess the truth of certain statements: in code con-
trolling automated commuter rail systems, e.g., the theorem that no two trains
occupy the same location at the same time has been proven [21]. With Face-
book’s 2013 acquisition of Monoidics, a theorem-proving start-up firm, these
techniques may be gaining greater public attention.
While the results are only as reliable as the proof assistant used, there is
reason to believe that mechanised, or ‘formal’, methods can achieve higher levels
of reliability than purely manual methods: as proof checkers are typically tested
on a wide range of problems, their results are not subject to preconceptions
4 Dijkstra famously said that ‘testing shows the presence, not the absence of bugs.’ [5]
about what the correct result should be in a particular problem. Further, com-
puters never tire of checking fine details, nor does their literalism allow them to
implicitly infer hidden assumptions.
Section 2 outlines how we addressed the two questions stated initially by
formal methods; concretely, we verify combinatorial Vickrey auctions. Section
3 justifies our choice of the Isabelle/HOL prover. Section 4 provides a ‘paper’
definition of Vickrey’s auction. Section 5 describes how we translated that into
the prover’s formal language and proved that the auction is soundly specified.
Section 6 describes the generation of verified code from the formalisation. Section
7 discusses related work, and section 8 concludes.
2 Our Approach
We use the Isabelle/HOL5 prover [11] to verify that the combinatorial Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is soundly specified, and to automatically gen-
erate executable code that faithfully implements the formally specified design.6
This auction is, of course, well understood (q.v. [2]): there is no doubt that it
is well defined, nor that it has been successfully implemented. We work with
Vickrey’s auction for precisely this reason: introducing the novel techniques of
mechanised reasoning and code generation in a simple and familiar environment.
2. Theorems
1. Definitions
formal specification
(written by Isabelle user, needs
review by auction designer)
Code
(executable Scala)
3. Proof
(4. checked by Isabelle)
state soundness
and other properties of
known to implement (by proof
and by trusting code generator)
5. code generation
(Isabelle)
proves
Figure 1. High-level outline of our approach
We proceed in five steps. 1. We define a Vickrey auction and 2. specify the
desired properties of a Vickrey auction, both in Isabelle/HOL’s formal input lan-
guage. Both steps require human expertise to ensure that the formal definitions
and specifications correspond to the auction designer’s intuition. Once this is
5 In the following, we use ‘Isabelle/HOL’ only for referring to the specific choice of
higher order logic (HOL) within the Isabelle theorem proving system.
6 In the following, we refer to both the combinatorial VCG mechanism and its single
good counterpart simply as ‘Vickrey’s auction’.
done, 3. proofs that the auction possesses its specified properties are manually
written in Isabelle/HOL’s language.7 Here, the property of interest is that the
Vickrey auction – viewed as a relation from inputs (bids) to outcomes (alloca-
tions and transfers) – is a function, associating a unique outcome to every valid
input. 4. Isabelle then formally checks the proofs, producing a proof object (also
called ‘certificate’) to confirm that the manual proof is correct, or to expose
faulty steps in the proof. 5. If the Isabelle/HOL definitions have been written
in a computable way rather than implicitly, they define the auction as an al-
gorithm, which Isabelle’s code generator can automatically export to a variety
of executable languages, including the Java-based Scala. Isabelle/HOL supports
both algorithmic and implicit definitions; e.g., one can state and prove the ex-
istence of the maximum element of some set without explicitly computing its
value. Implicitly defining a concept, such as the winners of an auction, without
supplying an algorithm, e.g. to solve the winner determination problem (WDP),
is usually more straightforward for an Isabelle user, the resulting formalisation
is close to textbook style and thus easier to review for auction designers, and
properties of concepts defined that way can be proved more easily in Isabelle
using classical reasoning.8 Generating verified executable code, however, does
require algorithmic definitions. We therefore develop two parallel formalisations:
using the previous example, we specify the concept of the winners of an auction
in the implicit style an auction designer would also use on paper (‘the winners
correspond to a value-maximising set of bids’), and we provide an algorithm for
solving the WDP, and then prove that it satisfies the specification, i.e. that its
result set is equivalent to the implicit definition. To keep figure 1 simple, we
detail this separately, with concrete examples, in figure 2. While this approach
involves a duplication of effort, it has the big advantage that the correctness of
the generated code depends exclusively on the definitions (specification) and the
correctness of the Isabelle system itself.9
7 Technically, this is interactive rather than automated theorem proving, which could
generate proofs autonomously. Section 3 further comments on this difference.
8 Proofs in classical logic, in contrast to constructive proofs, allow the law of the
excluded middle and thus proof by contradiction and therefore are usually shorter.
9 The alternative is to use a purely constructive logic. In the Coq and NuPRL theorem
provers, for example, it would be possible to just provide the paper-like specification
of the winning allocation as a definition, then, constructively, prove the soundness of
that definition, and then extract the algorithmic content of that proof (which solves
the WDP), i.e. executing the proof itself. While avoiding our duplication of effort,
the constructive approach not only has the disadvantage of making proofs more
difficult, but also making the development of verified efficient algorithms harder,
since efficiency has to be achieved by developing correspondingly usable proofs. This
is less direct than writing down specification and code separately and then proving
that the code meets the requirements of the specification.
3 The Isabelle/HOL theorem prover
We initially chose Isabelle/HOL because an earlier system comparison study
based on the proof of Vickrey’s theorem for single-good auctions proved its
general suitability for auction design, taking into account criteria such as the
expressiveness of its language, its combination of interactive and automated
theorem proving, its library coverage, and the comprehensibility of its input and
output language for auction designers [14].
Isabelle has historically been seen as an interactive, rather than automated,
theorem prover, meaning that it checks proof steps written by human users rather
than autonomously generating proofs. The ‘interactive vs. automated’ distinc-
tion has recently been blurring in theorem provers, with each adopting features
of the other [14]. Isabelle has three automated tools that we use; in practice, they
work best for small reasoning steps and time out otherwise. 1. Sledgehammer [4]
is an interface to automated theorem provers installed locally or available as
web services. 2. Nitpick [3] generates counterexamples and outputs them in a
human-readable notation. 3. The try command [20, section 12.10] provides an
integrated frontend, applying Sledgehammer, Nitpick and other built-in auto-
mated provers and disprovers to a proof goal.
propositional logic: concrete, finite statements
b1 > b2
sound, complete, decidable
not expressive
first-order logic: propositional + quantification (∀,∃) over objects
predicates (“finite(b) ∈ {true, false}”), functions (“max(b)”)
“for any finite bid vector, there exists a maximal bid”
sound, complete (Gödel completeness)
not decidable
higher-order logic: FOL + quantification over functions and predicates
“if n is an X over {a, b} then n is an X over all pairs”
sound
not complete (Gödel incompleteness) or decidable
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One reason for the historical view of Isabelle as an interactive theorem prover
is that it implements higher-order logic (HOL), the most expressive of the three
common classical logics briefly illustrated above. One common trait is soundness:
if a property, ϕ, is deduced from a system Γ of statements by proof steps (written
Γ ` ϕ), it is – in fact – a property of the system (written Γ |= ϕ).
Propositional logic is only able to express concrete, finite statements: given
fixed bids, for example, one can express that one exceeds the other. This sim-
plicity entails advantages: the logic is complete, meaning that any question can,
in principle, be answered by skillful use of the logic’s calculus in proof steps.
Formally, Γ |= ϕ implies Γ ` ϕ. The logic is also decidable: if a statement is
either true or false, then there is an algorithm for deriving its truth.
First-order logic (FOL) is more expressive than propositional logic, adding
the universal (for all, ∀) and existential (there exists, ∃) quantifiers, as well as
predicates and functions, to the former’s concrete objects. Gödel’s completeness
theorem proved that it is complete. Thus it may be possible to use fully auto-
mated theorem proving (ATP) to derive answers to questions [21, p. 31]. Against
this, though, FOL is no longer decidable: while completeness makes sure a formal,
finite proof exists for any true statement (this is called ‘semi-decidability’), no
universal algorithm exists to solve the preliminary problem of establishing the
truthfulness of any given statement.
Finally, higher order logic (HOL) adds quantification over functions and pre-
dicates to FOL, making it extremely expressive. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem
proved, though, that it is not even complete. As Isabelle implements HOL, it is
theoretically capable of expressing questions that simply cannot be answered –
ruling out the general possibility of applying automation. This hardly affects our
practical work: we are not posing ‘strong’ HOL statements, e.g., on the exist-
ence of functions that satisfy certain abstract properties, but are merely asking
whether given functions, which describe an auction, have certain concrete prop-
erties. We prefer HOL as it allows for naturally expressing the essential concepts
of auctions. When modelling bids as functions from a bidder and a set of goods
to a price, FOL would not support statements about all possible bids.
Not only is Isabelle/HOL’s language expressive, but it looks close to math-
ematical textbook notation and therefore, after some training, allows anyone
with a mathematical background to grasp the essentials of an Isabelle/HOL
formalisation; section 5 gives examples. However, the level of detail and explicit-
ness required for machine-checkable proofs, and for obtaining machine-generated
counter-examples, is much higher than on paper [14]. Thus, writing such a proof
in the first place is labour intensive and requires deep understanding of Isabelle.
Those proofs that Isabelle can generate automatically are even harder to read
for non-experts.
Finally, Isabelle’s ability to generate executable code in Scala was a key
criterion. Scala code runs on the Java Virtual Machine, can invoke Java code (and
vice versa), and has access to the rich libraries available for Java, including web
services, user interfaces and databases. Generating verified Scala code therefore
promises easy integration into business software; in fact, Scala is increasingly
being used for business-critical software.
4 Combinatorial VCG auctions
Our description of a multi-good or combinatorial VCG auction follows [2]: let
the set of agents be {0, . . . , N}, with agent 0 denoted as the seller and the rest
as bidders. The seller’s endowment is the set X0 6= ∅ of indivisible goods. An
allocation is a partition of the endowment, X1, . . . , XN , where component Xn
denotes bidder n’s share of the allocation. An admissible allocation does not
distribute more goods than the seller has available, but possibly fewer ones, so
that
⋃N
n=1Xn ⊆ X0. Any given bidder n privately values each subset of the
endowment X ⊆ X0 at vn (X)10; we assume vn (∅) = 0. Bidders simultaneously
10 Our present focus is not on efficiently representing valuations (cf. [6, part II]).
submit bids to the seller, bn (X) ,∀X ⊆ X0.11 In general, bn (X) may depend on
a bidder’s own valuation as well as n’s estimates of the others’ values.12
We assume that the seller seeks to maximise value, as proxied by bids. The
seller therefore solves for the value-maximising allocation,
X∗ ∈ argmax
X1,...,XN
N∑
n=1
bn (Xn) s.t.
N⋃
n=1
Xn ⊆ X0 and n 6= n′ iff Xn ∩Xn′ = ∅ (1)
at prices
pn ≡ αn −
∑
m 6=n
bm (X∗m) (2)
where
αn ≡ max
Xm
m=1,...,N,m6=n
∑
m 6=n
bm (Xm)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
m6=n
Xm ⊆ X0

is the value reportedly generated by the value maximisation problem when solved
without n’s bids. Thus, pn is the opportunity cost of the items won by bidder n
– their reported value to the remaining set of bidders, net of their value had n
not bid. Equation (1) is the winner determination problem (WDP). When there
are multiple solutions X∗ (we denote the set of them by X ∗), a tie-breaking
rule must be used to adjudicate. A typical solution involves assigning random
numbers to each possible bundle, denoted by rn (X), including the empty set,
rn (∅). The WDP is then run once more over X ∗ to maximise the sum of the
random numbers:
Y ≡ argmax
X∗∈X∗
N∑
n=1
rn (Xn) . (3)
When the random numbers are drawn from the same distribution, the tie-
breaking is neutral in the sense of summing over n draws in all cases.
We conclude by fixing these concepts in the context of two concrete examples.
Example 1 ([2, p. 23]). Assume N = 3 bidders submit the following bids for two
items A and B:
b1 (AB) = b2 (A) = b2 (B) = b3 (A) = b3 (B) = 2;
and bn (X) = 0 for all other n ∈ {1, 2, 3} and item sets X ⊆ {A,B}. This leads
to two equivalent value-maximising allocations; we focus on X∗ = (∅, A,B),
omitting the seller.13 Then
α1 = max
X2,X3
{b2 (X2) + b3 (X3) |X2 +X3 ⊆ X0 } = b2 (A) + b3 (B) = 2 + 2 = 4; and
α2 = max
X1,X3
{b1 (X1) + b3 (X3) |X1 +X3 ⊆ X0 } = 2;
11 In practice, the combinatorial task of supplying bids for all subsets ofX0 is a problem
that dynamic auctions seek to mitigate; it does not play a role in the present analysis.
12 Our formalisation does not make this probabilistic relation between bids and values
explicit but starts with the bids, skipping the values.
13 We use (∅, A,B) as a shorthand notation for x∗ = {∅, {A}, {B}}.
where α2 may be determined by either b1 (0)+b3 (B) = 2 or b1 (AB)+b3 (0) = 2.
Finally, by symmetry, α3 = α2 = 2. Prices are then
p1 = 4− [b2 (X∗2 ) + b3 (X∗3 )] = 4− [2 + 2] = 0;
p2 = 2− [b1 (X∗1 ) + b3 (X∗3 )] = 2− [0 + 2] = 0;
and, by symmetry, p3 = p2 = 0.
In the special case of a single good, it is well known that the combinatorial
Vickrey’s auction awards the good to the highest bidder, who pays a price equal
to the highest remaining bid; no other bidder pays anything.
Example 2 (A single good as a special case of the n-good case). Assume
– a single indivisible good A, i.e. X0 = A, and
– N bidders, each with bids bn (A) = bn, and bn (∅) = 0.
Let i be one of the bidders with the highest bids, i.e. bi = maxNn=1 bn. Then,
X∗i = A and X∗j = ∅ for all j 6= i, and αk = maxj 6=k bj for each bidder k =
1, . . . , N .14 Prices are pk = αk −
∑
j 6=k bj
(
X∗j
)
; concretely, pi = maxj 6=i bj and
pj = bi − bi = 0 for all j 6= i.
5 Proving that Vickrey’s auction is soundly specified
With the paper definitions in place, we now turn to demonstrating that Vick-
rey’s auction is soundly specified, associating a unique, well-defined outcome (an
allocation and transfers) to every valid input (bids). More formally, when viewed
as a relation from inputs to outcomes, Vickrey’s auction is left-total and right-
unique, i.e. a function. We prove three intermediate lemmas, whose conjunction
yields the result that Vickrey’s auction is a well-defined function:
1. ‘For each admissible input, the auction yields an outcome.’
2. ‘Any outcome of the auction – if one exists – is well-defined’, meaning that
the allocation vector does not allocate the same good more than once, and
does not exceed the set of available goods; and that each bidder’s payment
is non-negative.
3. ‘Any outcome of the auction – if one exists – is unique.’
We decompose our ultimate goal into these three intermediate goals for two
reasons. First, each of the three statements has a different structure 15 and
therefore requires a differently structured proof. Second, we seek to not just
14 Any of the sums in the definition of α only consists of at most one non-negative
summand: the allocation that awards the good to some bidder j (xj = 1), and for
which j bid bj .
15 For R(i, o) being the auction relation of an input i to an outcome o, the formal
structures of the statements are 1. ∀i.adm(i)→ ∃o.R(i, o), 2. ∀i∀o.R(i, o)→ wd(o),
and 3. ∀i∀o1∀o2.R(i, o1) ∧R(i, o2)→ o1 = o2.
accomplish a one-off soundness proof of one auction, but to develop a toolbox
of modular, reusable formalisations about auctions (cf. section 6): as proofs of
further properties of an auction may rely on some aspects of the overall soundness
proof but not on others, that toolbox should be modular.16
It turns out that for the combinatorial Vickrey auction goal 1 and 3 can
be established in a straightforward way, as the Isabelle/HOL language allows
concepts to be functions by definition.17 Equation (2) defines the transfers as a
function of the winning allocation; as long as the tie-breaking rule is definable
as a function, it picks a unique allocation; finally, goal 1 requires us to show that
a value-maximising allocation exists at all. From the implicit, textbook-style
definition (X∗ ∈ argmax∑ . . . ) this is not obvious at a glance; however, as we
explained in step 5 of section 2, the code generation objective requires us to define
an algorithm that computes the set of value-maximising allocations. Any such
algorithm reasonably assumes that a certain starting allocation (which always
exists, given non-empty sets of bidders and goods) attains the maximum value,
and would then search for a better allocation, but in any case it is definable
as an Isabelle/HOL function that returns a set of at least one allocation. It
remains to be shown that this function computes the same allocations as those
in the set argmax
∑
. . . . Goal 2 is also straightforward to prove: our definition
of value-maximising allocations precludes over-allocation by construction.
We state and prove soundness for a formalisation that is close to the original
textbook style of the definitions in section 4. We formalised the essential concepts
in three layers, from foundational mathematical structures to high-level concepts
specific to auction theory: partitions of a set (of goods to be auctioned), alloca-
tions of sets of goods (i.e. members of one such partition) to bidders, and finally
value-maximising allocations, i.e. solutions to the WDP. This is the paper-like
Isabelle definition of the set of possible allocations as the set of all relations
between partitions of the set of goods and bidders that are injective functions:
definition possible_allocations :: “goods ⇒ bidder set ⇒ allocation set”
where “possible_allocations G N = {potential_buyer . ∃P ∈ partitions G .
∧Domain potential_buyer ⊆ P ∧ Range potential_buyer ⊆ N
∧right_unique potential_buyer ∧ injective potential_buyer}”
6 Generating verified code
As explained in section 2, Isabelle cannot generate code from implicit definitions
such as the one stated above; instead, we had to provide a separate, algorithmic
definition of each relevant concept in functional programming style:
16 For example, in our earlier realisation of this approach for the single-good Vickrey
auction, the proof of Vickrey’s theorem makes use of the – now proved – fact that
the auction has a well-defined outcome.
17 As Isabelle/HOL is a typed language, this requires some discipline w.r.t. making
sure that functions are applied to arguments of admissible types and return a value
of the intended type.
fun possible_allocations_alg :: “goods ⇒ bidder set ⇒ allocation list”
where “possible_allocations_alg G N = concat [
[ potential_buyer .
potential_buyer ← injective_functions_list Y (sorted_list_of_set N) ]
. Y ← partitions_alg (sorted_list_of_set G) ]”
Instead of pulling into existence arbitrary partitions of the set of goods and
arbitrary injective functions from such partitions to bidders, and then keeping
those that meet the desired criteria, we invoke further algorithms computing the
exact lists of desired objects. Lists are often easier to compute with than sets; in
particular, sets have no order and therefore do not allow for defining algorithms
that pick one element18 and then recursively process the remaining ones.
Next, we need to prove the equivalence of both definitions, concretely, that
the list computed by the algorithm contains exactly the same allocations as
the set defined implicitly. In other words, we need to ensure that the algorithm
implements its (complete) specification. The proof, which is currently work in
progress, works by induction over the numbers of goods and bidders.
paper-like
formalisation
X ∗ ∈ argmax∑ . . .
{R ⊆P(N)×N ∣∃P ∈ parts(G).
Dom(R) ⊆ P∧ . . .}
{P ∣ ⋃P = A∧∀x ∈ P. . . .}
depends on
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argmax (x # xs) f =
if f x > f (hd (argmax xs f)) then ...
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Figure 2. Paper-like vs. algorithmic formalisation (definitions abridged; !≡ denotes an
obligation to prove equivalence)
On the two other formalisation layers there are analogous pairs of paper-like
and algorithmic formalisations proved to be equivalent, as shown in figure 2. If
the paper-like formalisation corresponds to the auction designer’s intuition and
if we trust the code generator, we know, by these equivalence proofs, that the
18 As we are dealing with finite sets, this is not a question of believing in the axiom
of choice. Of course we can pick some element out of a finite set, but only an order
on the set – easiest to obtain by converting it into a sorted list – guarantees that
repeated executions of an algorithm always pick the same element.
generated code faithfully implements the auction. If we additionally know that
the auction is sound (via theorems and proofs about the concepts defined, usually
in the paper-like formalisation, as it easiest to do proofs there), we know that the
generated code is correct, as explained in figure 1. In fact, the generated code
possesses any property that we prove of the paper-like formalisation – think,
e.g., of revenue equivalence results or dominant bidding strategies.
From the algorithmic definition of the Vickrey auction we generate a library
of Scala code, which includes verified code generated from everything in the
Isabelle library that these definitions depend on, such as list and set functions
and arithmetical operations. These largely operate on different datatypes than
those of the Scala library. For example, the generated code expects the bidders
to be a set of natural numbers, whereas a Scala program would more naturally
represent input provided by a user or read from a database as a list of integers,
or it represents prices as fractions of integers, whereas decimal notation would
rather be used on a user interface. Thus, to make the generated code usable in
real-world applications, one needs to provide wrapper code. Any such wrapper
or user interface code needs to be written with care, as it is not verified itself,
and could therefore introduce errors into the overall application.
Our formal specifications, the proofs and the generated code are freely avail-
able as part of an Auction Theory Toolbox [13], allowing their reuse in sub-
sequent problems, such as the verification of new, related auctions. At the time
of this writing, there are paper-like as well as algorithmic formalisations of the
single-good and the combinatorial Vickrey auction, a proof of ‘paper↔algorithm’
equivalence as well as a proof of Vickrey’s theorem in the single-good case, and
proof-of-concept Scala applications with console input/output that execute the
generated code. In the combinatorial case the equivalence proofs on the alloc-
ation and winner determination layers remain to be finished, and we need to
implement further tie-breaking rules. On a recent laptop all proofs are checked
within seconds.
7 Related work
There are three categories of work related to that in this paper: theorem proving
on auctions; verification of executable auction code; confirming that an auction
design is well specified by model checking.
7.1 Theorem proving on auctions
The authors of this paper have led, in collaboration with further theorem proving
experts, a comparative study on proving Vickrey’s theorem for single-good auc-
tions in a different systems [14]. Isabelle/HOL performed well in this comparison,
for reasons summarised in section 3, but it was neither the best system w.r.t. the
closeness of the formula input language to mathematical textbook notation nor
the comprehensibility of automatically generated proofs. Our study is incomplete
in that it did not yet evaluate the systems’ capabilities of managing a large, mod-
ular toolbox of formalisations, nor dealing with more advanced auction theory,
e.g. dynamic auctions or probabilistic notions of bidding.
7.2 Verifying auction algorithm implementations
That the consequences of an auction’s failure can be significant has been known
for some time. The Smith Institute for industrial mathematics and system en-
gineering19 has ‘assessed for correctness the software implementations of [. . . ]
algorithms’ used in UK spectrum auctions. The results have not been published,
but this work seems to involve traditional methods of running performance tests
on test cases.
7.3 Model checking and multi-agent systems
Third and finally, another formal verification technique has been applied to auc-
tions: model checking is not generally a substitute for theorem proving:
Theorem proving requires a deep knowledge of mathematical structures
and techniques, is usually only partly automatable, and is, in practice,
often very costly, since the task can usually only be carried out by ex-
perts. Model checking, on the other hand, relies on a complete, but auto-
mated, inspection of the system’s state space. This makes it computa-
tionally costly (in terms of time and space), but does not usually require
a specialist as in the case of theorem proving. In order to reduce the
computational problems, state-of-the-art model checkers employ a num-
ber of reduction techniques that make it possible to handle even large
state spaces relatively efficiently. [7]
An important restriction of model checking is that – as it involves exhaustive
search – it must operate on a finite state space. Tadjouddine, Guerin, Vascon-
celos [18] use SPIN, a widely-used commercial model checker based on a linear
temporal logic (LTL), to verify Vickrey auctions’ strategy-proofness property
that bidders cannot do better than to bid their valuations. They implemented
two forms of abstraction to reduce the search space while verifying the property
of interest for arbitrary bid ranges and numbers of agents: program slicing to
remove variables irrelevant w.r.t. the property, and discretising bid values (e.g.
‘higher than someone’s valuation vi’).
Model checking has often been applied when modelling auctions as sys-
tems composed of multiple interacting autonomous agents. For example, Xu,
Cheng [22] seek to detect shill bidders in concurrent auctions of identical goods,
looking for suspicious bidding behaviour, including pushing prices to a reserve
price before dropping out, and bidding on the higher priced version of the good.
They also use SPIN. As detecting suspicious behaviour does not prove that a
19 http://www.smithinst.co.uk/
bidder is a shill, the authors assign s-points for particular behaviours, higher
values of which are more suspicious.
Dennis et al. [7] develop open source model checking tools, using small auc-
tions as their primary test cases. In a simple auction in which between three
and five bidders submit sealed bids to an auctioneer, who awards a good to the
highest bidder, they formally verify that the bidder with the highest bid will
eventually believe that it has won the auction [19]. With even just four bidders,
each of whom is restricted to making one of three possible bids, this property
took just over an hour to verify.
Arcos et al. [1] studied ‘interactions that involve autonomous, independent
entities that are willing to conform to a common, explicit set of interaction
conventions’. Their leading example is a traditional open outcry auction house.
Their EIDE toolkit (electronic institution develop environment) supports both
static and dynamic verification. Static verification includes liveness checks to
ensure that agents won’t be blocked, that each scene (concretely: bidding round)
is reachable, and that the final scene is reachable from any other, as well as
correctness of the protocol (concretely: bid language). The dynamic verification
consists of simulations.
Finally, Michael, Parkes, Pfeffer [17] have developed an environment for sim-
ulating multi-agent economic environments, aiming at providing ‘a platform for
prototyping, testing and evaluating agent-mediated markets’, and implemented
the single-good Vickrey auction as an example. As the environment is imple-
mented in the logical programming language Prolog, which others have used for
exhaustive search, we could extend it to realise a model checking like approach.
We seem to need to
1. provide the missing implementations of the get_second_price and get_first_bidder
functions.
2. for any given set of bidders, sort the bid vector, b, so that bi ≥ bi+1.
3. generate the set, C, of all possible bid cases, an (n− 1)-digit bit vector
in which a ‘1’ in the ith position represents bi > bi+1 and a ‘0’ indicates
bi = bi+1.
4. for each c ∈ C, ensure that sealed_auction returns a unique outcome.
This seems straightforward for fixed, finite n. As a ‘proof’, it rests on our belief
that C correctly specifies the set of cases. Furthermore, the approach can be
modified in the special case of a second-price auction to handle arbitrary n by
noting that the outcome is fully determined by b1 and b2.
8 Conclusions
We have presented a step towards applying mechanised reasoning to the design
and practice of auctions. Specifically, we confirmed that a combinatorial Vick-
rey auction is a function from its input (bids) to its outcome (allocation and
transfers), and is therefore soundly specified. We have also generated verified
executable code that faithfully implements the combinatorial Vickrey auction.
Subsequent steps can be taken in at least two directions. First, the present ana-
lysis can be extended to more efficient algorithmic implementations of the win-
ner determination problem, to more sophisticated auctions, including dynamic
combinatorial auctions or hybrid auctions, and – finally – to auction designs
whose soundness remains an open question. Second, the usability of the present
method could be improved, allowing an auction designer to specify an auction in
a natural language, or to apply push button methods for verifying its properties
(rather than having to manually derive proofs), or to produce human-readable
proof that all valid input cases are satisfactorily accounted for or – failing that
– a human-readable counter-example.
We conclude on a modest note. First, the verification methodology presented
here is in its infancy, applied to known auctions rather than to novel ones. Thus,
their utility remains to be proven in auction design. Second, we expect that they
will have only a second order effect on auction design and implementation. The
highest profile auction failures often occur at the interface with the economic
environment in which they run: competitors are allowed to threaten each other,
or publicly seek collusive outcomes; setting a second licence’s reserve price at the
first’s sale price allows the winner of the first to ensure that the second is only
affordable to a monopolist [12]. Preventing these lies beyond the scope of the
tools presented here. These caveats notwithstanding, the importance of auctions
is such that even the second order benefits of ensuring their sound specification
and correct implementation are substantial – calling to mind Keynes’ hope that
economists might be seen as “humble, competent people on a level with dentists”.
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